“Virtual reality is no longer an exception: today, it is everywhere and everything.” (Shaviro 88)
“The actual and the virtual are mutually dependent. Neither is meaningful without the other.” (Shaviro 113)
I am visible, therefore I am: Appearances and surfaces. What Andy Warhol came to terms with. What make up our Myspace profiles. What we accept as real, and what we construct so that we ourselves can be real. In Dancing with the Virtual Dervish, Gromala makes her body visible as a simulated environment (107-109) – a virtual instantiation of a real body. As Shaviro attests, she reclaims her body in the process of abstracting it. At the same time her constructed hyperreality attests to the interplay between body and embodiment, virtual and real.
I am perceived, therefore I am: There is no “real,” only virtual. And nobody ever inhabits the same virtuality. What does a pear taste like…to you? As in cognitive science, as Shaviro points out, “the ‘real world’ of our perception is in fact largely a construction of our own inner cognitive processes…what matters is only its effect within my mind” (83-84). Simulation is all that we have. Second life is a hyperreality, but no more than the hyperreality of first life, and perhaps that is why the two do not seem that different. We navigate both lives through the windows of our perception, a consciousness metaphorically distilled from a fragmentary chaos, “discontinuous, contingent, and continually creative” (122). There is the event (a “singularity”), and the recollection of the event with all its verities. The same parts of the brain are activated for perception as for imagination. The more you think about something, the stronger those neural connections (networks!) become, the easier that thought is to recall (and can be triggered), and the more “real” it seems. Shaviro’s discussion of cognitive science, neuroscience and psychedelic drugs extends the framework of forces that act upon us, from the technologies that reorganize our senses on a macroscopic level to the chemicals that do it on a microscopic level (185). So then psych patients suffering from disorders like depression are given a combination of chemical and cognitive therapy (this combinatory treatment is statistically the most successful). I immediately think of other psychiatric disorders that layer our understanding of human subjectivity. There is schizophrenia, characterized by a fragmentary and depersonalized subjectivity, often associated with A.I.; and autism, often characterized by “impaired” communication and social interaction. Social constructs play just as much a role in the formation of identity as do hormones and neurotransmitters, an interplay between culture and biology, body and embodiment, consciousness and unconsciousness, ad infinitum the network.
I am in debt, therefore I am: The global network is defined by capital. Shaviro says, “money at once grounds and volatizes virtual reality” (128), where virtual reality is a “space of flows” in which space has subordinated time (and time has become timeless – Castells). Money is by and large virtual, bits of information that form the fabric of flows. Work is play, the “new leisure” (137), hence, a culture of commodity is what makes a virtual playground engaging, indeed, a playground at all. In the network society a person is no longer enslaved, but indebted, “where every human transaction is instantly monetized and commodified, indebtedness is what makes it all work. You are only as good as your line of credit” (159). Financial assets are the essence of power. To contribute to the network society is to be economically productive.
I am connected, therefore I am: From a practical standpoint, being disconnected from the network has a multitude of consequences. The growth of economies, education, technology, etc. depend on the network, and those that are disconnected are invisible, “lost to the world where information is power” (176). The free market/network is a self-organized system that in many ways follows the laws of natural selection. It has no empathy or ultimate goal, and is in a perpetual state of transformation. Being disconnected from the network does not mean you reside outside of its influential reach, only that you do not profit from it.
I am what I am: Ellis and Bochner’s overview of autoethnography was most interesting to me because of my background as both a fiction and non-fiction writer. The methods of autoethnographers are essentially the methods of any writer. In particular, it reminds me of new journalism and the literary genres of creative non-fiction and memoir. They employ the same methods for the same purposes, and come across the same ethical issues; writing is always an introspective as well as a cultural study, composed both subjectively and analytically, “displaying multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural” (739) – to me, it seems, writing and autoethnography are one in the same– both are studies and both are fictions. We construct and consume stories to help explain and relate to the world around us, and ultimately, to create meaning for ourselves. Both autoethnography and writing (especially creative non-fiction) employ literary devices and conventions in order to tell a story, where the writer is the voice and the gatekeeper, the one who takes the fragments of experience and pieces them together. Some selected things about autoethnography that Ellis/Bochner point out, which echo the things I have repeatedly learned in writing courses:
- “it’s not a project you’ll ever complete or get completely right; instead, you strive to get it ‘differently contoured and nuanced’ in a meaningful way” (752) – writing is a perpetual process, revisions upon revisions, where the final piece (even after it is published) is always subject to more revisions
- “it’s good to write about an event while your feelings are still intense, and then to go back to it when you’re emotionally distant” (752) – many writers keep journals to record their immediate thoughts and reflections, where later on they begin to analyze; same goes with drafts – several writers advise you put a draft away for a couple of months and then return to it, with a fresh perspective for revision
- “relying on memory, editing, and selecting verbatim prose out of context and then surrounding it with their own constructed analytic contexts” (753) – the very process of writing, in particular, new journalism and creative non-fiction; you organize the thoughts, feelings, events, memories, etc. into a narrative that reveals some sort of insight
- “you’ll essentially have to learn how to write by reading novels, and by writing and rewriting and getting feedback” (757) – this was the first thing I was ever taught about writing – you learn how to write not only by writing, but by reading – and the revision/feedback process is crucial
In a way, it was strange reading about autoethnography – seeing creative (or reflexive) writing within a scientific framework, although it makes complete sense within a social science framework – it’s just normally framed in the context of new journalism (I think of Joan Didion’s “Slouching Toward Bethlehem” and how those stories were essentially social studies). I wrote a creative non-fiction piece years ago (naked observations) in an attempt to tell both a personal story and to analyze the subject of sex/sexuality; I never looked at it through a social-scientific lens, but after reading Ellis and Bochner, I see the essay as both creative non-fiction and autoethnography. I think the qualitative methods of autoethnography are really important and the opportunities for learning, both internally and externally, are enormous, where again, writing is essentially a method of learning. Positivist models fail in their negation of narrative, for “life and narrative are inextricably connected” (745). In the crisis of representation, positivist truth is as flimsy as the transcendental self; “the self is indistinguishable from the life story it constructs for itself out of what is inherited, what is experienced, and what is desired” (746). We can gain a much deeper insight of the human subject by recognizing the fiction of experience and reading our own stories.
Another good point they made was about the usefulness of narratives and the limits of institutional approaches toward studying subjects such as illness (an often overlooked “Other”). Narratives bridge the gap between researcher and subject: “Most of these stories are written by people who don’t want to surrender to the victimization and marginal identities promoted by the canonical narrative of medicine” (749). The autism youtube link above (under the “I am perceived, therefore I am” section) is a good example of such a constructed narrative, with activist uses. Phoebe Sengers in her article “Schizophrenia and Narrative in Artificial Agents,” argues against institutional psychiatry (where “the patient is formalized, reduced to a set of somewhat arbitrarily connected symptoms…no longer a living, unique, complex individual but fragmented into a pile of signs”) in favor of narrative psychology. She says: “Narrative psychology shows that, whereas people tend to understand inanimate objects in terms of cause-effect rules and by using logical reasoning, intentional behavior is made comprehensible by structuring it into narrative or ‘stories.’ Narrative psychology suggests that this process of creating narrative is the fundamental difference between the way people understand intentional beings and mechanical artifacts.” Sengers, like Ellis and Bochner, prioritizes holistic and operant frameworks of analysis over “accuracy” and clean “categorization,” where the issues are “what narratives do, what consequences they have, to what uses they can be put” (746). Autoethnography calls for involvement and agency.




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